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Abstract: We employ propensity score matching and a traditional control 
function approach to examine the impact of participation in various 
societal institutions on micro-firm performance in Mexico. We find that 
firms that participate in credit markets, receive training, pay taxes and 
belong to business associations exhibit significantly higher profits, even 
after controlling for the various factors that drive participation in those 
institutions.  We also find that firms that borrow from formal or informal 
sources and those that pay taxes are significantly more likely to stay in 
business, but firms that received credit exhibit lower rates of income 
growth. Overall, our results suggest that even if the best performing 
micro-firms are more likely to be selected into participating in societal 
institutions, causality also runs in the opposite direction. In particular, 
increases in strictly or broadly defined formality have the potential for 
increasing profits and survival rates, and appear to bring micro-firms 
closer to their optimal sizes.  
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Micro-firms account for roughly 50% of employment in Latin America and 
substantially more in Africa and Southeast Asia.  Raising their productivity therefore 
ranks high as a development goal and eliminating impediments to their dynamism as a 
central concern of policy.  Using a very detailed micro-firm data set with a panel 
dimension from Mexico, this paper examines how micro firm performance is affected by 
several dimensions of their business environment: access to formal and informal credit, 
training programs, business associations or guilds, and government taxation and services.  
Following the convention of the literature on evaluation in quasi-experimental contexts, 
we conceive of engaging with these institutions as treatments and attempt to measure 
their impact.    
In our sample the share of treated firms is low: less than 10% of micro-firms have 
received credit or training services and less than 17% participate in industry or trade 
associations. This is often seen as evidence of supply bottlenecks that limit access to 
financing, human capital, and information. Releasing those constraints would permit 
firms to approach the steady state size dictated by their intrinsic entrepreneurial ability.
1  
However, it may also be that for many firms, the steady state size is very small and thus 
there is, in fact, little demand for these treatments.  For example, a sizable literature 
dating from Harris and Todaro (1970) argues that most informal micro-firms are run by 
individuals who did not enter the sector due to their higher entrepreneurial ability or other 
cost advantages, but rather are essentially queuing for entry into salaried jobs and are 
unlikely to be thinking of future growth. In sum, while in one approach increasing the 
supply of credit, training and information services would lead to improved business 
performance, in the other it would amount to pushing on a string and have little impact. 
    Empirically, estimating the magnitude of any treatment impact is not trivial.   
Both views imply self selection into the treatments considered which potentially imparts 
serious bias to naïve ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.  As an example, applying for 
                                                 
1 In Lucas’(1978) model, for instance, factors such as location and entrepreneurial ability determine firm-
specific costs structures and optimal firm sizes. Newly created firms would tend to converge to their steady 
state sizes, provided that they are not supply-constrained in their access to factor or goods markets.   3
bank credit, seeking out training, and joining a business association could all reflect 
superior underlying entrepreneurial ability, rather than any impact of the treatment.   
The final dimension of the business environment – payment of at least some taxes 
(31% in our sample)- is the most common indicator of “informality” in the literature and 
poses a particularly interesting treatment with potentially distinct selection issues.  One 
literature views informality as evasion of taxes (for example, Loayza, 1996): firms that 
pay them do so because they had the bad luck of being detected by government.   
However, tax payments may be also seen as the cost of gaining access to social services 
that are necessary for the expansion of businesses.   For instance, as de Soto (1989) 
pointed out in the case of Peruvian street vendors, weak property rights made expanding 
risky and the vendors actively sought to pay their taxes to gain “quasi-property rights” 
over their respective pitches.  More generally, registration with the government makes it 
possible to engage in legal contracts, participate in risk pooling and worker insurance 
mechanisms, and borrow from formal financial institutions.
2 Treatment, in this second 
view, would yield a positive impact on firm performance, and it would be subject to the 
same selection problems that affect the estimation of the treatment effects of access to 
credit, training and participation in business associations.    
To minimize the potential estimation biases arising from the self-selection of 
firms into the various treatments, we employ two different techniques and three different 
sets of conditioning variables. After reporting naïve OLS estimates as a first 
approximation, we focus on Propensity Score Matching, a method that thanks to the 
advantage of being non-parametric has become increasingly popular in recent years.
3  Its 
main shortcoming, however, is that it models selection into treatment as depending only 
on observable variables. This may lead to biased estimates if there are unmeasurable 
individual characteristics – e.g. unobserved entrepreneurial ability – that affect both the 
likelihood of treatment and the associated outcomes. Thus, we also use a conventional 
control function approach that seeks explicitly to model the selection on unobservables, 
                                                 
2 As one all encompassing view,  Levenson and Maloney (1996) recast the question of 
formality/informality as the firm’s decision of how much to participate or engage in the institutions of civil 
society: federal and local treasuries, governmental programs such as social security, the legal system, the 
banking system, trade organizations, civic organizations, etc. This view is consistent with the emerging 
literature on social capital and networks that views formal and informal services as substitutes. See, for 
example Portes and Landolt (2000) and Stiglitz (2000). Tybout (2000) provides an excellent literature 
review on this topic. 
3 For a review of this literature see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) and Imbens (2004).  For recent 
work in the  developing countries context see, for example,  Jalan and Ravallion (2003), Newman et al. 
(2002) and Galasso, Ravallion and Salvia (2001).   4
even if in the process it imposes strong assumptions on the functional forms of the 
selection and outcome equations.  As Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) argue, the 
two techniques are closely related and matching can be seen as a special case of control 
function methods where the former assumes that conditioning eliminates bias through the 
“conditional independence assumption” (CIA) whereas control function methods 
explicitly model selection bias.  In this approach, the preference for one or the other 
method cannot be driven by their intrinsic technical advantages, but rather should be 
based on a judgment on which choice of underlying assumptions is most plausible. 
 As further robustness checks, with both methods we control for selection on an 
increasingly rich set of firm characteristics. At least in the case of propensity score 
matching, this brings us progressively closer to satisfying the CIA.  The trade off is that 
since these variables may be correlated with both treatments and outcomes, we may also 
be progressively foreclosing channels through which the treatment may be working.  This 
sequential approach arguably yields upper bounds that may be potentially affected by 
selection biases arising from unobservables, and lower bounds that are not, but which 
may miss some of the influence of the treatment. 
As a final set of checks against bias, in the matching exercise, we test for the 
problem of non overlapping supports (identified by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1998 
as the largest source of bias) and we follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983b) in checking 
for the validity of the CIA.  We also check the sensitivity of all estimates to the use of an 
alternative measure of firm profits. 
In the final section of the paper, we utilize the panel dimension of the data to look at 
the impact of credit, training, taxes and guild membership on firm growth and survival. 
Here the self-selection problem is less serious since we can include initial income in the set 
of conditioning variables, thus arguably capturing a wider set of unobservables that affect 
treatment participation.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the different methodologies 
and discusses the assumptions that allow us to use them. Section III describes the data. 
Section IV presents the estimations for the probability of participation and treatment 
effects. Finally, conclusions are presented in the last section.  
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II. Methodological Details 
 
Several options exist for estimating the impact of these treatments on firm 
performance. Very generally, we want to estimate  
 
(1)   ( , ) 0,1 dd d d Yg X U d ==      
 
where d indexes the occurrence of a certain treatment (whose random variable will be 
denoted by D∈{0,1}) , Yd denotes an outcome of interest, and X and U are observable and 
unobservable characteristics of the firm.  Again, we can associate treatment with the 
formal status of the firm: taking out a bank loan may lead to upgrading of accounting 
procedures, greater efficiency of capital and higher profits; joining a business association 
may introduce the entrepreneur to new technologies of ways of doing business; training 
workers may also lead to greater efficiency in the use of capital and labor.  We can define 
Y1 to be the outcome if the firm is exposed to the treatment of interest and Y0 to be the 
outcome if the firm was untreated. For a given individual i, the observed outcome Yi can 
be written Yi = Y0i + Di (Y1i-Y0i).  The fundamental problem, of course, is the inability to 
observe the same individual both with and without treatment effects.  Although this 
problem cannot be solved at the level of any individual, we can identify the average 
treatment effect of the population. Parameters that only depend on the marginal 
distribution of Y1i and Y0i are the ‘average treatment effect’ (ATE) E(Y1-Y0), the average 
treatment effect on the non-treated’ E(Y1-Y0|D=0) and the ‘average treatment effect on 
the treated’ (ATT) E(Y1-Y0|D=1). The last is the effect of most interest in the literature. 
 
Matching techniques 
Though numerous arguments have been put forward for using matching 
techniques, their most attractive quality is perhaps not imposing functional relationships 
between the treatment and the outcome. Matching techniques effectively create a pseudo 
control group with observable characteristics that are arbitrarily “similar” to the “treated” 
group.   6
In practice, matching techniques use one of several possible distance measures to 
find observations that are “close” to those in the control group.  As the set of 
characteristics that are taken into account increases, and/or if they contain continuous 
variables, the number of observations in each cell to be matched gets very small (or null). 
Alternatively put, it becomes difficult to find individuals with traits that appropriately 
match those of the treated in all relevant dimensions.  One popular solution is that of 
basing the matching of treated and controls on the conditional predicted probability of 
participating in the program – the so-called propensity score P(x)=Pr{D=1|X=x}  the 
conditional probability of participation given a vector of observed characteristics x.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a) show that, by definition the treatment and non-treatment 
observations with the same value of the propensity score have the same distribution of the 
full vector of regressors X and it is therefore sufficient to match exactly on the propensity 
score
4- a single variable on the unit interval- to obtain the same probability distribution of 
X for treated and non-treated individuals. This variable should contain all the information 
in X relevant for the ATT
5. In practice, the propensity score can be derived parametrically 
from either probit or logit methodologies. 
What is important is that these average effects are the reduced form impacts 
arriving through any number of channels of unspecified functional form: we do not 
impose any functional restrictions on g(.), nor do we need a set of excluded variables to 
identify it.   Matching offers a very flexible non-parametric form of estimating the impact 
of a treatment. 
However, the validity of the matching estimators relies on the CIA, which states 
that conditional on the X’s used to match, the control group does not differ from the 
treatment group by any variable which is systematically linked to the non-participation 
outcome Y0: That is the selection is on observables (Heckman and Robb, 1985).  In short, 
the CIA can be expressed as: 
(2)  X D Y | 0 ⊥  
                                                 
4 An additional requirement for propensity score matching is:  X x   1 ) ( 0 ∈ ∀ < < x P . 
5 According to Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998), if the outcome depends on X only through P(X), there 
is no advantage to conditioning on X over conditioning on P(X). Condition on the propensity score has 
some advantages over covariate-matching methods. According to Imbens (1999) inference for ATT is less 
sensitive to specifications of the propensity score than on covariates. Angrist and Hahn (1999) show that 
for some plausible scenarios (such as small cell-sizes and probability of treatment far from ½) propensity 
score matching estimators could be more efficient than exact-matching ones.   7
where  ⊥  denotes stochastic independence. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) 
demonstrated that a weaker assumption, “conditional mean independence” (CMI), is in 
fact sufficient: 
(3) ) 0 , | ( ) 1 , | ( 0 0 = = = D X Y E D X Y E  
How innocuous the CIA (or the simpler CMI) is depends on how much we 
believe that unobserved variables are irrelevant to both the likelihood of treatment and 
the outcome realization.  The concern that the CIA may not hold is not particular to the 
present application but extends to the myriad papers on the impact of active labor market 
policies as well: to the degree that ambitious or talented workers self-select into training 
programs, we may confound superior job market performance due to unobserved human 
capital with the impact of the treatment.   
 
Growth 
Alternatively, if we have at least two periods for the same individual, by looking 
at the behavior of second period income, we can capture the dynamic effect of treatment 
instead of the static levels effect analyzed in the first part of the paper.  Suppose that two 
periods are available for each individual (t’>t) and define: 
 
(4)  ) ( ) ' ( 1 1 1 t Y t Y R − =  
(5) ) ( ) ' ( 0 0 0 t Y t Y R − =  
 
Note that the first period outcome variable can be considered part of the selection process 
and hence can be included as a covariate in the propensity score. More specifically let 
)) ( ) ( ( ˆ
1 0 t Y t Y X X ∪ ∪ =  and further define E(R1-R0|D=1) as the parameter of interest, 
that is the average treatment effect on the treated measured. If Y is in logs, this can be 
interpreted as the average treatment effect on the treated on growth (ATTG). Using the 
same arguments that we used before, matching analysis requires: 
 
(6)  X D R ˆ | 0 ⊥  
 
In this panel context, assumption (6) is more defensible than its levels counterpart.  If we 
assume that the information about future growth is contained in present period profits   8
conditional on the other controls in the propensity score, as is the case in Jovanovic’s 
(1982) noisy selection framework, then we are likely to be controlling for the fact that a 
higher expected level of growth will affect the desire for treatment.  Whether or not the 
treatment is available would then determine the eventual growth outcome.
6  
The ATTG can be interpreted as the effect of the treatment on outcome growth 
conditional on starting with the same level of outcome and regressors at t. Clearly, this 
controls for any impact that treatment has had in the past on growth.  However, the same 
logic appears in cross-country growth regressions where obtaining the rate of growth 
requires conditioning on the initial level of income. The interpretation should be about 
whether the treatment had a permanent income effect on growth rates vs. the one off 
impact that appears in the levels regressions above. 
 
Survival 
The treatments may also affect the likelihood of survival, rather than the growth 
of the firm.  To analyze this explicitly let S be an outcome dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if the micro-firm survives and 0 otherwise. As before, we can condition on the 
treatment occurrence to construct S0 and S1. Matching procedures allow us to construct a 
non-parametric estimate of the effect of various treatments on the probability of firm 
survival. In a parallel way as we proceeded before, the assumption required is: 
 
(7)  X D S ˆ | 0 ⊥  
                                                 
6 We still have a missing data problem that requires an additional assumption:  
)) ( , ( )) ( ), ( , ( 1 0 t Y X P t Y t Y X P =  
That is the actual level of income and the covariates X are sufficient for obtaining the propensity score.  
This posses additional concerns similar to the inclusion of covariates which may themselves be affected by 
the treatment (see below) because we will be able to observe the initial income only in one treatment status 
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Note that the conditioning variables also include the initial level of income, which, again, 
is likely to capture further unobserved firm characteristics that affect both the probability 
of being treated and the likelihood of firm survival. 
 
 The propensity score 
Following Dehejia and Wahba (1999) matching estimation is done in two steps. 
First, we estimate the propensity score by probit models. Selection of the variables that 
determine the propensity score is an important issue.  As Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 
(1997) argue, X should contain those variables such that assumption (1) is satisfied but 
the prediction should not be “excessively good” (i.e. that predicts D perfectly). Extremely 
different distributions of the predicted propensity score by treatment status would make it 
difficult to find comparable individuals, and this is a major source of evaluation bias. 
Endogenous regressors are potentially problematic if the treatment makes the support of 
treated and non-treated disjoint. We examine this possibility in detail in Appendix II, 
where we also examine, for the main covariates, the impact that the potential presence of 
non-overlapping support may have on post-matching bias. 
Two matching procedures are used in this paper. First, we compute Nearest 
Neighbor estimates, and second, we apply a Kernel based method using Epanichnikov 
kernel and a fixed bandwidth of 0.06. In both cases, we compute estimates with and 
without the common support restriction on the domain of the propensity score. 
 
Expanding the Conditioning Set to Deal with Unobservables 
As a robustness check, we follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983b) and observe the 
sensitivity of the results as progressively more covariates are added to the first stage 
model of the determinants of being treated. In practice we start by including in the 
propensity score only those variables of X which can credibly be considered exogenous to 
the treatment, namely a set of individual characteristics H.  Since the excluded regressors 
may have a positive correlation with the outcome, these estimates are therefore likely to 
provide an upper bound to the treatment effect.  We then add to the first stage propensity 
score model a set of variables Z which are likely to control for unobservables but are also 
likely to be affected by the treatment. These variables are the firm’s capital stock, number 
of workers and time in business. Finally in the third set of conditioning variables, we add   10
the set of other treatment variables (F). We interpret the corresponding estimates as 
capturing not only additional unobservables that may drive both firm performance and 
participation in various societal institutions, but also isolating the pure effect of each 
treatment from others with which it might be correlated.  
As mentioned above, one concern is that some of the variables included in the 
second and third set of conditioning variables may be endogenous. As argued by 
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), the exogeneity of the conditioning set X is 
not strictly required for matching methods, but the real treatment effect is masked if this 
condition is violated. If the treatment has a positive impact on these regressors, this 
estimation will understate the impact of the treatment, and it will constitute a lower 
bound.  Indeed, we are excluding the treatment effect that operates through the regressors 
of the propensity score model, so that the estimated treatment effects are in practice 
conditional on these other regressors not changing. Thus, for instance, when we add 
employment size, and capital stocks to the X vector, we are effectively measuring not the 
total effect of our treatments on firm profits, but rather the effects on the efficiency with 
which existing factors of production are used by similar treated and non-treated micro-
firms.
7  
An additional concern is the possible non-overlapping support of conditioning 
variables which, as shown by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998), is an important 
potential source of bias for matching methods. To check whether this is indeed a problem 
in our case we examine the generated distributions of the propensity score for treated and 
non-treated firms, and evaluate the post-matching bias in the main covariates.  
 
The Control Function Approach 
As argued by Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) the standard treatment effects 
regression has the important advantage of allowing for selection on unobservables and 
hence not requiring the relatively strong CIA assumption underlying matching methods.  
As is generally well known, control function approaches introduce to eq. (1) an additional 
selection equation describing a latent variable D*, such that the treatment occurs if D*>0 
                                                 
7 Implicitly we assume the existence of two different ways through which the treatment affects the 
outcome. First, a direct effect which is the result of buying a new equipment in the case of credit or 
increasing labor productivity in training. Second, an indirect effect, related to the impact on the firm’s 
market performance and efficiency. Using regressors affected by the outcome may restrict our estimates to 
the latter.   11
only.  If  X can be partitioned into two not necessarily disjoint sets (Q,T) such that Q 
affects the outcome equation while T determines the selection part it is possible to 
estimate the following model:  
 Outcome  equation:  u D Q g Y + + = δ ) (  
  Selection equation:  v T h D + = ) ( * 
where D=1 if D*>0 and D=0 otherwise.  Selection bias is then treated as an omitted 
variable problem.  As is common, linearity is assumed in the g and h functions. This set 
up imposes a much stricter parameterization on the outcome equation than matching does 
and than we would prefer since we think that treatment may be accompanied by changes 
in the production process.  In our case no justifiable exclusion restrictions can be found to 
separate Q and T and therefore semiparametric estimators cannot identify g(.)
8. Imposing 
assumptions about the joint distribution of u and v, i.e. that they follow a bivariate normal 
distribution offers another alternative although  Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2000) 
have shown that distributional misspecification in this setting can impart important bias.    




  We employ the National Survey of Microfirms (Encuesta Nacional de 
Micronegocios, ENAMIN) for the years 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998. This survey covers 
a sample of individuals who declare that they are self-employed in a broader labor 
survey, the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU). It is restricted to micro-firms 
with at most 6 workers (including owners) for all economic sectors except manufacturing 
where the range is from 1 to 16 workers. We restrict the sample to micro-firms with 1 to 
6 workers to be consistent across industries. The ENAMIN allows a relatively precise 
construction of a wide variety of variables that represent basic firm and entrepreneur 
characteristics: profits, employment size, capital stocks, time in business, and 
engagement with a wide variety of societal institutions, including those for which 
treatment effects are estimated in this paper. In addition, we are able to construct, from 
the ENEU, several variables representing personal characteristics of the entrepreneur and 
                                                 
8 See Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) for a review of the different assumptions needed for each 
estimation procedure and recent development in control function semiparametric approaches.   12
his/her household. These include the size of the household, and the entrepreneur’s 
gender, age, level of schooling and position in the household (i.e. head or not). 
The treatments are all captured as indicator (dummy) variables.  The first is the 
receipt of at least one loan at some undetermined date after the business was established 
(New Credit). Since the ENAMIN provides information about the source of the 
corresponding loans, we are able to break this out into the receipt of loans from formal 
credit providers, namely banks or non-bank financial institutions (Formal Credit), and 
loans from informal sources, including family, friends, clients and suppliers (Informal 
Credit). Our second treatment is the receipt of some type of training during the year 
preceding the survey (Training) by  either the owner of the firm or any of its workers. 
The third  is the payment of at least some taxes as one of the regular expenditures made 
by the micro-firm (Taxes). Finally, our last treatment is membership in either the union or 
business association related to the firm’s activity or sector (Guild).  
As measures of firm performance we work primarily with “profits” as reported in 
the ENAMIN. This is calculated as revenues minus declared costs not including owner’s 
labor and is perhaps better seen as a measure of income. In fact, as a robustness check, 
we also use the net income from self-employment reported by the owner of the firms 
when interviewed in the ENEU. In logs, the correlation of the two variables is 0.59.  We 
construct the variables measuring firm growth and survival, by exploiting the panel 
nature of the ENEU. The survey follows the owners of the firms covered by the 
ENAMIN for  four quarters after the initial interview so we can calculate the log 
difference between initial and final income over a period of one year as a measure of 
growth. Survival is captured by a dummy variable indicating whether individuals that  
initially reported being self-employed (with the detailed firm characteristics covered in 
the ENAMIN) were still self employed a year later or rather transitioned to being salaried 
workers, unemployed or out of the labor market. Since the nature of the rotating panel 
implies that  only 20% of the sample linked to the ENAMIN can be observed a year later, 
the samples in which we explore dynamic outcomes are reduced to about one-fifth of the 
original ENAMIN sample. 
The variables employed in the paper are described in Appendix I with summary 
statistics presented in Table 1. Within the group of micro-firms on which we focus – 
those with at most 6 workers – the average number of workers (besides the owner) is 0.6, 
and two-thirds of the firms are owner-only. However, despite their small size the sampled   13
micro-firms have been in business for 8 years on average, and 50% are more than 5 years 
old. Average monthly profits are about US$ 360, in prices of late 1997, with the median 
entrepreneur earning US$205 per month.
9 The median enterprise has a capital stock of 
about US$600 and generates an income of US$450.  
As for personal and household characteristics, the average Mexican micro-
entrepreneur in our sample is 42 years old and lives in a household with 4 other 
individuals. Almost 70% are males, 83% of which are heads of household, compared to 
only 28% of female entrepreneurs that are household heads. Almost half of the micro-
firm owners in the sample have at most some primary education and only 15% have 
attended college. 
With regard to the variables for which we estimate treatment effects, only 4% 
report having received a loan from financial institutions, and 7% percent have borrowed 
from informal sources. A similarly low proportion of micro-firm owners (6%) reports 
having received training themselves or offered it to their workers during the previous 
year and 17% belong to some type of union or business association. As mentioned before, 
the high degree of informality of the sector is illustrated by the fact that almost 70% of 




IV.1. Propensity scores estimates 
  Tables 2a-c present the standard probit models used to generate the propensity 
score for the six treatments analyzed: New Credit, Formal Credit, Informal Credit, 
Training, Taxes and Guild. The marginal effect on the probability of participating in a 
treatment is reported. As discussed earlier, we divide the conditioning variables X into 
three sets: individual specific variables unlikely to be affected by the treatment, H; 
variables specific to the firm that may be important in explaining the treatment, but which 
may also be affected by it, Z; and finally the full set including other treatment variables, 
F. Each new set of variables progressively reduces the influence of omitted firm variables 
on the predicted likelihood of treatment. This makes the validity of the CIA more likely, 
but also potentially closes off some legitimate channels of influence.   
                                                 
9 Similar values are obtained using the information reported as total net income from self-employment in 
the ENEU: that variable has an average of US$325 and US$219.   14
Though the estimation of P(X) is not the end of the analysis in itself and we do 
not examine it exhaustively, a few results merit noting. To begin, using the smallest 
conditioning set H, table 2a suggests that individual entrepreneur characteristics are 
significantly related to treatment, a perhaps unsurprising result given the small size of the 
firms.
10 Older workers are more likely to engage in most institutions, as are the more 
educated.  The exception here is that more educated workers are not especially more 
likely to have received informal credit than entrepreneurs with only primary education.
11 
Credit is more likely for entrepreneurs that are household heads and have larger 
households, while female micro-entrepreneurs are less likely to engage in all except 
training (perhaps because of the existence of government-sponsored training programs). 
 When we add variables specific to the firm, table 2b shows that the importance of 
some individual characteristics falls significantly, suggesting that H and Z cannot be 
treated as orthogonal.  First, the coefficient on the age of the entrepreneur and its 
significance both fall, possibly due to the inclusion of the time in business variable which 
is strongly significant in all treatments except training.  The two size variables, capital 
stock and number of workers, enter positively and significantly in virtually all cases.  
Overall, this is consistent with Levenson and Maloney’s formulation of formality, 
broadly conceived as participation across a variety of societal institutions, as a normal 
factor of production for firms operating in a Jovanovic (1982) type environment of noisy 
selection. In particular, larger and older firms could have a higher demand for the 
services provided by civil society institutions because they face a lower probability of 
failing, and a greater capacity for amortizing the fixed costs involved in participation (e.g. 
the cost of revealing their existence to tax authorities, membership fees, formal 
accounting procedures, etc.).   
More specifically, both time in business and size may capture both greater credit 
worthiness and the availability of collateral, and hence access to credit.  In terms of 
training, evidence from the US (Lynch and Black, 1995) shows that employers who had 
invested more in physical capital are more likely to have invested in workers’ instruction.  
                                                 
10 For instance, as Berkowitz and White (2002) note for the US, debts are personal liabilities of the firm’s 
owner, so that lending to a firm is legally equivalent to lending to its owner. 
11 This is consistent with many studies of credit markets in the US (see for instance Jappelli, 1990 and 
Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman, 2003) that find that age is highly significant for determining 
whether an individual is credit rationed. For training, many papers have studied individual decisions to be 
treated but fewer have looked at the firm (see for example Frazis, Gittleman and Joyce, 1998).  
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Since participation in business associations is largely voluntary, the correlation with size 
and time in business suggests the normal good theory of participation.  Again, being 
registered with taxes is more complicated, offering two observationally equivalent 
stories.  On the one hand, bigger, more established firms need government services more.  
On the other, size and time in business are also likely to be correlated with the probability 
of detection by tax authorities under the evasion hypothesis of informality.  Hence, we 
cannot empirically identify the relative importance of the “paying taxes to purchase 
services” and the “evasion” views by looking at these correlates alone but must wait for 
the impact of the treatment itself.  In all cases, since in many theoretical models both size 
and time in business are actually driven by entrepreneurial ability (again, see Jovanovic, 
1982 for an example), we are likely to be purging unmeasured entrepreneurial quality.  
Table 2c adds the other treatments (F).  The results indicate a statistically 
significant positive correlation between all the dimensions of formality or participation in 
societal institutions hereby considered. The expansion of the conditioning set in the 
propensity score estimation therefore has the effect of capturing a possible general 
movement toward formalization and isolating the particular impact of each treatment.  
For instance, if the impact of registering with the tax authority is purely driven by the fact 
that this may be a precondition for accessing formal credit markets, then conditioning on 
the latter variable in the propensity score should reduce the measured impact of paying 
taxes on firm performance.   
  Probit estimates for the restricted sample that will be used for estimating 
treatment effects on growth and survival are not reported but they are available from the 
authors upon request. Overall the results are very similar to those in the full sample. 
Moreover, as could be expected given their high correlation with size and education, first 
period profits are positively correlated with the likelihood of receiving all treatments. 
 
IV.2. Matching and control function estimates. 
Profit and income levels 
 
  Tables 3, 4 and 5 report estimates of the treatment effects on profit levels, using 
OLS, matching and treatment regression techniques respectively. The naïve OLS 
estimates indicate that all the treatments have positive and significant effects on micro-  16
firm profits, a result that is confirmed by the propensity score estimates. In both cases, the 
magnitude of the estimated effects is considerably sensitive to the set of regressors 
included in the propensity score model. This suggests that some caution needs to be taken 
when asserting the CIA, especially with narrow conditioning sets. In fact, in all cases, 
moving from the minimal to the complete conditioning set, reduces the impact of the 
treatments, in some cases dramatically: for example, the impact of new credit declines by 
a factor of almost four. How much of this is due to really eliminating the bias arising 
from violation of the CIA and how much to masking of the true effect by conditioning on 
Xs affected by the treatment is difficult to nail down. The matching estimates do allow 
for speculation on the direction of bias in the estimates of each treatment. When only the 
covariate set H is used, we obtain the greatest ATT estimates, while their magnitude 
decreases as this set is enlarged (adding the sets Z and F). As we mention earlier, the 
former should be considered as the upper bound and the latter the lower bound.  
Appendix II analyzes the quality of matching, both looking at the standardized 
differences in the covariates and at the common support before and after matching. We 
are generally able to construct a distribution quite close to that of the treated group. As a 
result, estimates with and without imposing the common support restriction are very 
similar. We thus report only the estimates based on the whole support of the propensity 
score domain (restricted estimates are available upon request). 
Table 5 presents the maximum likelihood control function estimates. The MLE 
estimates are less volatile than two-step procedures in the absence of exclusion 
restrictions although they impose further restrictions in the distribution of the error terms. 
In all the cases we compute robust standard errors.  Further, simple tests for the structural 
break in g0, g1 suggests that the non-parametric approach to the impact of the treatments 
implicit in matching is more desirable.
12  
Taken together, the battery of estimation techniques and assumption sets generate 
striking commonalities that allow us to bracket the likely “true” value of the parameters. 
Although the magnitudes are generally somewhat lower, in virtually all cases, the 
estimates with the ENEU income variable are broadly consistent with those that emerge 
from the ENAMIN using the same estimation techniques.  For this reason, we focus 
primarily on the results from the ENAMIN profit variable. 
                                                 
12 Two-step estimates and structural break tests are not reported here but they are available from the authors 
upon request.   17
 
The impact of credit 
The matching and OLS estimates suggest that firms treated with any kind of new 
credit have a profit level  between 9% and 37% , with the estimates falling dramatically 
moving from P(H) to P(H,Z,F) as would be predicted. The control function MLE 
estimates fall between these bounds (28% and 36%).  A similar pattern is visible when 
we  focus on the effect of receiving credit from formal sector sources, but the returns are 
substantially higher.  Here, estimates range from 22% to 73% in the matching and OLS 
estimators and from 39% to 60% in the control function MLE approach. Access to 
informal credit, on the other hand, yields more modest results ranging from 3% to 23% in 
the matching and OLS estimates, with statistically non-significant effects when the full 
conditioning sets are used. With the control function MLE approach, however, the impact 
of informal credit on profits is significant with wider conditioning sets, and varies from 
13% to 18%.   
  Taken together, the results suggest that access to credit does improve performance 
and that formal credit has an impact perhaps two or three times that of informal credit.  
These estimates need to be taken with caution as the matching procedure cannot 
significantly reduce the post-matching bias in some Z- covariates (see Appendix II): the 
comparison group has on average less capital stock and employees than the treated group 
(25% and 10% respectively for formal credit, 9% and 7% for informal credit). In 
consequence, our estimates are believed to be biased upward, and no further reduction in 
the bias can be done in this context. However, the fact that similar results are obtaining 




Paying taxes: bad luck or the price of useful government services? 
 
The impact of paying taxes is large and significant with all three methods, ranging 
from 30% to 63% with OLS, 22% to 66% with propensity score matching and close to 
60% in the control function MLE regressions.  Strikingly not a single specification yields 
a negative coefficient that would be expected if being discovered by the government and 
being made to pay taxes were completely without benefit and constituted a pure tax.    18
Overall, it would seem that, on average for those complying, paying taxes is not 
detrimental and something to be evaded, but actually improves firm performance. Again, 
under the evasion hypothesis, unlike the other treatments, there may be no bias if  once 
controlling for the factors that would make a firm more visible, such as size or having 
been in business a long time, detection is more or less random or, perhaps negative if  
less clever entrepreneurs are detected more often.  On the other hand, if registering to pay 
taxes buys services that increase income, the biases move in the same direction as those 
of the other treatments and the interpretation of the results needs to proceed similarly. In 
fact, the behavior of the estimates under different conditioning sets does seem to follow 
patterns similar to those of the other treatments, in particular, falling significantly as the 
conditioning set is expanded, with the only exception of the control function approach, 
where the argument for declining effects is in any case weaker, given that unobservables 
are expected to be controlled for even with the narrowest conditioning set.  Thus, at 
minimum, formality in the straightforward sense of paying government taxes  leads to a 
20% increase in profits and, arguably, substantially more. 
 
 
Training and Business Associations 
  
OLS and matching estimates suggest that firms where the owner or some workers 
received training exhibit profits that are between 7% and 33% higher than those of their 
peers. However, non-significant and even negative effects are obtained with control 
function models, potentially suggesting that unobserved entrepreneur characteristics 
could be driving the positive treatment effects derived with the other estimation methods. 
Moreover, the Appendix II shows that some post-matching bias in the Z-covariate set 
persists, revealing that training may be an exclusive attribute of large firms. 
Finally, participation in a business association or guild has an impact of between 
9% and 35% with OLS and matching methods, and an overlapping range of 7% to 22% 
with the control function.  The lower bound across all techniques is around 10%.   
   19
Income Growth 
 
  The ability to link the ENAMIN to the ENEU means that we can create a panel 
where profits are observed at two points in time, and extensive firm and personal 
entrepreneur characteristics that would determine selection into treatment are available 
for the initial period. While the data is not structured to permit the use of a difference in 
differences matching approach that would clear out any unobserved characteristics that 
could violate the CIA, the possibility of controlling for initial profits provides some 
additional defense for the CIA.   
Table 6 reports unconditional average income growth by treatment status. It 
clearly appears that without controlling by any enterprise or personal characteristics non-
treated firms exhibit higher – although still negative, on average – rates of income 
growth. Our OLS, matching and control function estimates (tables 7 through 9) reduce 
this gap but do not reverse its sign. Moreover, with both OLS and matching, receiving 
credit – particularly if from informal sources – is significantly related to lower rates of 
income growth. The negative results are strongest with the Kernel matching but they are 
weakly echoed by the nearest neighbor matching estimates.  These estimated negative 
treatment effects on growth could suggest that the treatment effects on the first period 
income move firms toward their steady state sizes with attendant reduction in growth 
rates as they converge.  Alternatively, as matching is done on after-treatment initial levels 
of profits, one could argue that the worse performing treated are matched to the best non-




Table 10 shows the raw survival likelihood by treatment status: on average treated 
individuals show a 10% higher probability of survival. It thus appears that despite the 
lack of positive effect of the treatments on growth,  they do increase the likelihood of 
micro-firm survival. Since control function techniques are not applicable in this context,   20
we use propensity score matching estimates to check whether these differences are driven 
by the factors that determine selection into treatment.
13  
Although the effects become non-significant when other treatments are controlled 
for, both matching techniques suggest that access to credit is associated with higher 
survival probabilities (table 11).  When using the Kernel approach these positive effects 
are also significant for loans received from either formal or informal sources, with larger 
magnitudes obtained in the former case. Moreover, while access to training and guild 
membership appear unrelated to firm survival, we find that firms that pay taxes are 
significantly more likely to stay in business, a result that is robust to changes in 
estimation methods and in the set of conditioning variables. Concerns about reverse 
causality cannot be completely ruled out as firms which foresee a bleaker future than 
what their fundamental and observable characteristics would lead to predict would have 
no incentive to comply with government regulations – including paying taxes. However, 
another possible interpretation is that credit and registering with the government provide 
firms with means for insuring themselves against negative shocks – e.g. ex-ante by 
diversifying their types of customers or ex-post by borrowing in bad times – thus 




  This paper has employed two different techniques to explore the impact of credit, 
training, tax payments and participation in business guilds on firm profits, growth and 
survival likelihood.  To deal with the selection biases that are likely to affect naïve 
estimates of those treatment effects, we employ both propensity score matching and 
control function estimation methods, and take several different approaches to robustness 
testing.   
  In the end, the results of the two techniques are reasonably compatible with each 
other.  We find positive impacts of all treatments on the profit levels of micro-firms, even 
in the cases where the use of wide conditioning sets may lead to underestimating true 
treatment effects. This suggests that even if best performing firms may be selected into 
                                                 
13 See also Fajnzylber et al. (2005), which studies the determinants of micro-firm survival using probit 
models.   21
participating in an increasing array of societal institutions, this participation does feed 
back into further improvements of firm performance.  
We also find that at least access to credit and straightforwardly defined formality 
– the fact of paying government taxes – are significantly related to an increase in the 
likelihood of firm survival, a result that we interpret as reflecting increased access to 
better ex-ante and ex-post risk coping mechanisms. Finally, somewhat surprisingly, we 
find negative – although, except in the case of credit, non-significant –  treatment effects 
on growth, a result that is consistent with treated firms being closer to their optimal or 
steady state sizes.  
    22
Appendix I: Variable description 
ENEU variables : 
•  Age: entrepreneur age.Age2: square of Age. 
•  Education: dummy for maximum education level reached. Prim: primary, Sec: 
secondary, High: more than secondary education. Base group: no education. 
•  Female: dummy for women. 
•  Married: dummy for married individuals. 
•  Npers: number of individuals in the household. 
•  Head: dummy variable for head of household. 
•  Real Income (Y): real monthly income from main job. 
•  Real Income Annual Growth (R): ln Real Wage (t’) – ln Real Wage (t). 
•  Survival (S): dummy for entrepreneurs who were interviewed in the ENAMIN 
and declare to be self-employed/owners next year.  
ENAMIN variables: 
•  Real Profits (Y): declared profits. 
•  Capital Stock: sum of the replacement cost of all owned or borrowed physical 
capital and the market price of all firm inventories. 
•  Number of Workers: number of paid and non-paid workers including owner.  
•  Credit: dummy for firms that got credit after the business started. 
•  Time in Business: years since owner began the activity or became head of the 
business. 
•  Credit: dummy for firms that obtained credit after start-up. 
•  Formal Credit: dummy if the credit was obtained from banks, savings accounts or 
lending institutions. 
•  Informal Credit: dummy if the credit was obtained from friends, relatives, clients, 
providers or particular lenders.  
•  Training: dummy for firms where the owner or any of the employees attended a 
training course the year before the ENAMIN was done. 
•  Taxes: dummy for firms that declared paying taxes either at the local or the 
federal level. 
•  Guild: dummy for firms affiliated to a guild.    23
•  Appendix II: Tests for the Quality of Matching 
 
  First we plot in figures AII-1 and AII-2 the propensity score kernel density 
estimates by treatment category. In the former case we use only H for estimating the 
propensity score, while in the latter we use (H,Z). Note that for Formal Credit and 
Training the non-treated distribution is collapsed around zero, meaning that our estimates 
are particularly successful in estimating non-participation, which could to some extent 
bias our estimates because of non-overlapping support. For Taxes, we also have strong 
predictive power when including the firm specific variables, but there exists a sufficient 
overlapping region.  
  Whether this constitutes a problem for matching can be informed by comparing 
the post-matching bias of certain covariates of the treated and the matched non-treated. 
Table AII-1 presents the post matching standardized bias (in percentage) of the selected 
covariates in all the matching estimations used through the paper. Most treatments show 
customary levels of matching quality for human capital and firm variables with the 
deviations falling well within 10% of one standard deviation (10.0). Formal Credit and 
Training are the treatments that show a higher bias, which means that it was difficult to 
find similar individuals to the treated ones. Note that larger deviations in capital stock, 
workers and time in business variables appear in the first panel. Figures AII-3 and AII-4 
plot the treated and the matched (re-weighted) non-treated densities, which show that 
propensity score matching does a relatively good job. As a final check for the non-
overlapping common support problem we also used matching estimators with trimming, 
imposing a common support for treated and non-treated on the propensity score domain. 
The estimated treatment effects are very similar to those reported through the text. These 
estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
We also present some descriptive statistics on post-matching bias for the 
restricted sample used for growth and survival analysis (table AII-2).    24
Table AII-1 – Post-matching standardized bias of selected covariates (in %) 






Credit  Training Taxes Guild 
Matching using H                   
ln Capital Stock*  51.0 80.4  39.9 44.2  89.4 39.4 
ln Workers*  51.4 72.6  38.6 31.4  62.7 32.9 
Time in Business*  14.5 24.6  6.2 -0.4  18.8 21.7 
Age  -0.2 -1.6  0.0 -7.8  0.5 -0.4 
Prim  -1.3 -9.5  -1.8 -10.0  -1.1 2.5 
Sec  0.2 3.5  2.3 6.3  -3.8 0.1 
High  1.3 10.0  0.4 5.6  4.4 -2.7 
Matching using (H,Z)                   
ln Capital Stock  8.0 25.5  9.3  10.4 3.9  3.0 
ln Workers  2.2 10.3  7.3  0.2  -0.1  -2.8 
Time in Business  1.5 0.8  0.7  -0.6 3.7  -1.6 
Age  0.8 -3.4  0.4  -6.7 2.7  -0.8 
Prim  0.2 -3.3  -1.1  -9.0 2.8  2.5 
Sec  0.8 2.7  1.9  4.9 -2.0  0.6 
High  -0.6 3.2  -0.2  6.1 -2.0  -3.0 
Matching using (H,Z, F)                   
ln Capital Stock  7.6 24.8  8.9  8.7  3.4  2.4 
ln Workers  2.7 10.5  7.3  -1.5  0.6  -3.0 
Time in Business  1.5 1.0  0.6  -0.6 3.4  -1.8 
Age  0.8 -3.1  0.5  -7.0 2.6  -0.7 
Prim  0.1 -3.4  -1.1  -8.8 2.2  -8.5 
Sec  1.0 3.1  1.9  5.6 -2.1  0.7 
High  -0.9 2.7  -0.3  5.1 -1.1  -3.2 
Notes: * not used for matching. All the results correspond to Nearest Neighbor matching procedure.
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Table AII-2– Post-matching standardized bias of selected covariates (in %) 
 
  
New Credit  Formal 
Credit 
Informal 
Credit  Training Taxes  Guild 
Matching using (H,Z,Y) 
(small sample - survivors 
only)                   
ln Initial Income  2.3 14.4  10.9 2.1  3.5  1.8 
ln Capital Stock  0.5  25.2  6.8 9.9 3.0 4.7 
ln Workers  2.4 7.0 7.7 2.1 2.6 0.3 
Time in Business  -4.2 1.7 3.6 -2.2 4.1 -5.3 
Age  -2.7 -1.2 6.4 -7.5 4.5 8.5 
Prim  -2.1 -2.2 -1.7 -9.9 0.2  2.1 
Sec  1.4 1.9 0.0 6.9 -0.4  -3.0 
High  1.6 3.0 2.3 4.4 0.0 0.0 
Matching using (H,Z,Y) 
(small sample - all)                   
ln Initial Income  3.0 11.8 2.0  7.1 -0.8 -1.4 
ln Capital Stock  2.5  23.0  0.7 9.8 3.2 4.6 
ln Workers  4.9 7.8 4.6 3.2 2.0 0.9 
Time in Business  -0.6 4.6 -1.2 2.1 3.9 -5.9 
Age  -0.1 0.9 0.2 -3.9 3.6 -1.7 
Prim  -0.9 -5.3 0.0 -7.6 0.9 1.6 
Sec  -0.6 4.7 -1.1 0.4 -0.8 -1.5 
High  2.4 2.0 2.6 9.2 -0.7  -1.0 
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Table 1 - Summary statistics     
ENAMIN-ENEU (Complete sample) 
Var. Obs.  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max. 
log Real Income*  31867  7.42 0.95 2.62  12.59 
log Real Profits  32077 7.42  1.20  -0.11  13.27 
New Credit  35044  0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Formal Credit  35044  0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Informal Credit  35044  0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Training  35044  0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Taxes  35044  0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Guild  35044  0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
log Capital Stock  35044 7.97  3.39  -0.11  16.22 
log Workers  35044  0.33 0.48 0.00 1.79 
Time in Business  35037  8.21 9.19 0.17  51.00 
Female  35044  0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Head*  35044  0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Npers*  35044  4.81 2.22 1.00  23.00 
Married  35044  0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Age  35044  42.13 13.55 12.00 97.00 
Age2  35044  1958.59  1253.38 144.00 9409.00 
Prim  35044  0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Sec  35044  0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
High  35044  0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
* ENEU   33
 
 
Table 1 (cont.) - Summary statistics 
ENAMIN-ENEU (Small sample) 
Var. Obs.  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Dif.  log Real Income*  4480  -0.06 0.79 -4.11 4.06 
log Real Income (all)*  5392  7.44 0.97 3.04  12.59 
log Real Profits (all)  5418 7.44  1.19  -0.11  11.92 
log Real Income (surv.)*  3993  7.54 0.93 3.38  12.59 
log Real Profits (surv.)  4043 7.54  1.17  -0.11  11.51 
New Credit  5925  0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Formal Credit  5925  0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Informal Credit  5925  0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Training  5925  0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Taxes  5925  0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Guild  5925  0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
log Capital Stock  5925  8.03 3.38 0.00  16.00 
log Workers  5925  0.34 0.49 0.00 1.79 
Time in Business  5923  8.30 9.41 0.17  51.00 
Female  5925  0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Head*  5925  0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Npers*  5925  4.81 2.20 1.00  17.00 
Married  5925  0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Age  5925  42.73 13.54 12.00 90.00 
age2  5925  2008.75  1263.41 144.00 8100.00 
Prim  5925  0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Sec  5925  0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
High  5925  0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Survival  5925  0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
* ENEU. (surv.): survivors only.  34
 Table 2a – Probit estimates 
  Treatment 
   New Credit  Formal 
Credit 
Informal 
Credit  Training Taxes  Guild 
ln Capital Stock           
            
ln Workers           
            
Time in Business           
            
Female  -0.065 -0.146 -0.022 0.183 -0.136 -0.239
   -(2.30)* -(3.36)** -(0.71) (5.14)** -(6.13)** -(9.27)**
Head  0.138 0.118 0.12 0.029 0.081 0.064
   (4.91)** (2.77)** (3.87)** -(0.81) (3.69)** (2.54)*
Npers  0.014 0.007 0.014 -0.013 -0.009 0.012
   (2.97)** (0.99) (2.75)** (1.95) (2.27)* (2.82)**
Married  0.051 0.11 0.01 0.001 0.14 0.017
   (2.08)* (2.97)** (0.38) (0.03) (7.33)** (0.78)
Age  0.031 0.06 0.013 0.038 0.054 0.033
   (6.79)** (8.50)** (2.54)* (5.81)** (15.45)** (8.36)**
Age2  0.0000 -0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   (7.28)** -(7.61)** (3.82)** (6.32)** (12.92)** (7.43)**
Prim  0.141 0.118 0.128 0.079 0.228 0.099
   (3.89)** (2.18)* (3.20)** (1.37) (8.08)** (3.14)**
Sec  0.355 0.48 0.221 0.632 0.611 0.202
   (9.32)** (8.50)** (5.25)** (10.76)** (20.37)** (5.98)**
High  0.597 0.893 0.264 1.097 1.135 0.379
   (13.24)** (13.97)** (5.17)** (16.89)** (31.35)** (9.38)**
Formal Credit           
            
Informal Credit           
            
Training           
            
Taxes           
            
Guild           
            
Constant  -2.277 -3.741 -1.892 -3.037 -2.61 -1.871
   -(19.14)** -(20.45)** -(14.47)** -(17.66)** -(27.58)** -(17.69)**
Observations 35044 35044 35044 35044 35044  35044
Pseudo R2  0.0870 0.1213 0.0757 0.1978 0.1307  0.1318
Prob > Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Notes: Estimation includes dummies by year, industry and state although they are not reported.  
z values in (). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 2b – Probit estimates 
    Treatment 
   New Credit Formal 
Credit 
Informal 
Credit  Training Taxes  Guild 
ln Capital Stock  0.079 0.12 0.056 0.071 0.198 0.067
   (19.49)** (16.59)** (12.75)** (13.84)** (54.65)** (19.58)**
ln Workers  0.418 0.445 0.283 0.248 0.483 0.319
   (20.63)** (15.85)** (12.37)** (9.66)** (27.26)** (16.97)**
Time in Business  0.011 0.018 0.004 -0.001 0.012 0.018
   (8.68)** (9.98)** (2.97)** -(0.42) (11.78)** (16.18)**
Female  0.049 -0.016 0.055 0.287 0.058 -0.151
   (1.64) -(0.33) (1.69) (7.72)** (2.33)* -(5.64)**
Head  0.109 0.074 0.102 0.012 0.038 0.029
   (3.70)** (1.58) (3.19)** (0.33) (1.55) (1.10)
Npers  0.01 0.002 0.012 -0.014 -0.015 0.008
   (2.04)* (0.20) (2.26)* -(1.98)* (3.56)** (1.81)
Married  -0.018 0.042 -0.039 -0.048 0.029 -0.039
   -(0.71) (1.04) -(1.41) -(1.52) (1.38) -(1.71)
Age  0.013 0.046 -0.001 0.028 0.031 0.018
   (2.78)** (5.96)** -(0.13) (4.13)** (8.08)** (4.37)**
Age2  0.0000 -0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   (4.39)** (6.22)** (1.64) (4.75)** (6.87)** (5.12)**
Prim  0.076 0.01 0.088 0.058 0.112 0.031
   (1.97)* (0.15) (2.10)* (0.93) (3.53)** (0.94)
Sec  0.171 0.233 0.093 0.497 0.294 0.032
   (4.17)** (3.60)** (2.10)* (7.84)** (8.65)** (0.90)
High  0.252 0.466 0.017 0.845 0.575 0.086
   (5.18)** (6.40)** (0.31) (12.05)** (14.07)** (2.00)*
Formal Credit            
             
Informal Credit            
             
Training            
             
Taxes            
             
Guild            
             
Constant  -2.649 -4.633 -2.116 -3.484 -3.88 -2.144
   -(21.03)** -(22.29)** -(15.65)** -(19.40)** -(36.04)** -(19.40)**
Observations 35037 35037 35037 35037 35037  35037
Pseudo R2  0.1473 0.2170 0.1054 0.2279 0.2831  0.1749
Prob > Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Notes: Estimation includes dummies by year, industry and state although they are not reported.  
z values in (). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 2c – Probit estimates 
  Treatment 
   New Credit  Formal 
Credit 
Informal 
Credit  Training Taxes  Guild 
ln Capital Stock  0.068 0.103 0.049 0.057 0.193 0.052
   (15.96)** (13.91)** (10.68)** (10.62)** (52.77)** (14.64)**
ln Workers  0.375 0.398 0.254 0.175 0.454 0.258
   (18.08)** (13.87)** (10.89)** (6.56)** (25.24)** (13.37)**
Time in Business  0.01 0.017 0.003 -0.003 0.011 0.017
   (7.45)** (9.24)** (2.12)* -(1.70) (10.66)** (15.11)**
Female  0.043 -0.029 0.053 0.285 0.055  -0.167
   (1.42) -(0.60) (1.64) (7.63)** (2.19)*  -(6.21)**
Head  0.104 0.067 0.098 0.002 0.034 0.022
   (3.53)** (1.43) (3.08)** (0.05) -(1.39)  (0.85)
Npers  0.01 0.002 0.012 -0.014 -0.015  0.009
   (2.11)* -(0.31) (2.25)* -2.08)* -(3.61)**  (2.01)*
Married  -0.014 0.047 -0.036 -0.05 0.034  -0.039
   -(0.54) (1.16) -(1.30) -(1.57) (1.61)  -(1.69)
Age  0.011 0.043 -0.002 0.024 0.03  0.015
   (2.25)* (5.50)** -(0.41) (3.49)** (7.71)** (3.70)**
Age2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   (3.85)** (5.78)** (1.33) (4.13)** (6.42)** (4.43)**
Prim  0.076 0.009 0.087 0.061 0.112 0.023
   (1.94) (0.15) (2.08)* (0.97) (3.51)**  (0.70)
Sec  0.156 0.216 0.085 0.486 0.286 0.003
   (3.78)** (3.30)** (1.91) (7.56)** (8.39)**  (0.08)
High  0.205 0.415 -0.01 0.809 0.547 0.013
   (4.16)** (5.61)** -(0.18) (11.37)** (13.33)**  (0.31)
Formal Credit        0.30 0.15 0.20
         (6.12)** (3.68)** (5.29)**
Informal Credit        0.16 0.06 0.23
       (3.49)**  (1.97)*  (7.63)**
Training  0.28 0.27 0.16    0.21 0.23
   (7.22)** (5.58)** (3.66)**    (6.19)** (6.47)**
Taxes  0.11 0.17 0.05 0.16     0.20
   (4.86)** (5.13)** (2.10)* (5.53)**     (9.66)**
Guild  0.23 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.20   
   (9.64)** (5.17)** (7.29)** (6.66)** (9.10)**   
Constant  -2.557 -4.477 -2.071 -3.315 -3.842 -1.994
   -(20.13)** -(21.37)** -(15.20)** -(18.31)** -(35.57)** -(17.88)**
Observations  35037 35037 35037 35037 35037 35037
Pseudo  R2  0.1548 0.2247 0.1095 0.2363 0.2866 0.1821
Prob > Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000
Notes: Estimation includes dummies by year, industry and state although they are not reported.  
z values in (). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         37
 
Table 3 - Profits, OLS.    
Covariates:  H H,Z  H,Z,F 
Profits (ENAMIN)    
New Credit  0.379 0.122 0.095 
 (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.019)**
Formal Credit  0.622 0.268 0.227 
 (0.032)** (0.030)** (0.030)**
Informal Credit  0.217 0.030 0.014 
 (0.024)** (0.023)** (0.022) 
Training  0.298 0.112 0.073 
 (0.028)** (0.026)** (0.026)*
Taxes  0.626 0.310 0.298 
 (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.014)**
Guild  0.335 0.130 0.099 
 (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.016)**
Covariates:  H H,Z  H,Z,F 
Income (ENEU)    
New Credit  0.255 0.090 0.072 
 (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.014)**
Formal Credit  0.419 0.193 0.165 
 (0.024)** (0.023)** (0.023)**
Informal Credit  0.152 0.030 0.019 
 (0.017)** (0.016)* (0.016) 
Training  0.235 0.110 0.083 
 (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.020)**
Taxes  0.423 0.219 0.210 
 (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)**
Guild  0.204 0.073 0.049 
  (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.012)**
Notes:  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4 - Profits, ATT propensity score matching estimates - 
different methods 
Matching on:  P(H) P(H,Z)  P(H,Z,F) P(H) P(H,Z)  P(H,Z,F) 
Profits (ENAMIN)  Nearest neighbor  Kernel 
New Credit  0.353 0.085 0.095 0.394 0.115 0.093 
 (0.041)** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.023)** (0.022)** (0.021)** 
Formal Credit  0.611 0.250 0.209 0.734 0.331 0.313 
 (0.054)** (0.047)** (0.043)** (0.034)** (0.033)** (0.029)** 
Informal Credit  0.200 -0.026 -0.011 0.226 0.047 0.033 
 (0.051)** (0.035)  (0.043) (0.022)** (0.022)* (0.027) 
Training  0.307 0.124 0.085 0.325 0.163 0.121 
 (0.043)** (0.053)** (0.043)** (0.028)** (0.029)** (0.033)** 
Taxes  0.656 0.266 0.229 0.636 0.232 0.225 
 (0.020)** (0.022)** (0.024)** (0.016)** (0.018)** (0.021)** 
Guild  0.345 0.102 0.094 0.339 0.118 0.092 
 (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.020)** (0.018)** (0.016)** 
Income (ENEU)  Nearest neighbor  Kernel 
New Credit  0.243 0.054 0.100 0.263 0.096 0.083 
 (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.022)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.015)** 
Formal Credit  0.382 0.153 0.177 0.503 0.257 0.251 
 (0.041)** (0.050)** (0.038)** (0.025)** (0.023)** (0.025)** 
Informal Credit  0.146 0.028 0.022 0.169 0.054 0.044 
 (0.031)** (0.037)  (0.028) (0.022)** (0.02)* (0.017)** 
Training  0.246 0.126 0.075 0.253 0.140 0.113 
 (0.031)** (0.038)** (0.037)* (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.028)** 
Taxes  0.405 0.173 0.154 0.402 0.154 0.147 
 (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.011)** (0.014)** (0.015)** 
Guild  0.198 0.055 0.045 0.199 0.062 0.044 
   (0.019)** (0.021)* (0.023)** (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.016)** 
Notes: Kernel based matching methods using Epanichnikov kernel and a fixed bandwidth of 0.06. 
Bootstrapping standard errors based in 50 replications with 100% sampling. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1% assuming normality. 
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Table 5 - Profits, Treatment Effects  Regression 
Covariates:  H H,Z H,Z,F 
Profits (ENAMIN)    
New Credit  0.313 0.362  0.280 
 (0.053)** (0.038)** (0.038)** 
Formal Credit  0.393 0.604  0.490 
  (0.253) (0.056)** (0.061)** 
Informal Credit  0.114 0.181  0.130 
  (0.068) (0.044)** (0.043)** 
Training  -0.176 0.021  -0.199 
  (0.157) (0.142)  (0.260) 
Taxes  0.574 0.608  0.584 
 (0.037)** (0.027)** (0.028)** 
Guild  0.073 0.219  0.089 
  (0.091) (0.042)** (0.052) 
 Income (ENEU)  H H,Z H,Z,F 
New Credit  0.114 0.204  0.133 
 (0.050)** (0.045)** (0.048)** 
Formal Credit  0.238 0.333  0.188 
 (0.081)** (0.080)** (0.086)* 
Informal Credit  -0.037 0.084  0.048 
  (0.068) (0.061)  (0.062) 
Training  0.217 0.197  0.128 
 (0.049)** (0.047)** (0.048)** 
Taxes  0.161 0.451  0.429 
  (0.102) (0.033)** (0.035)** 
Guild  -0.191 -0.080  -0.263 
  (0.069)** (0.094)  (0.082)** 
Notes:  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.. MLE treatment 
regression. 
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Table 6 – Income growth statistics 
   Real Income Growth (ENEU)
Treatment Treated  Non-treated 
New Credit  -9.8% -4.9% 
Formal Credit  -18.2% -5.2% 
Informal Credit  -8.1% -5.4% 
Taxes  -8.4% -4.4% 
Training  -11.5% -5.4% 
Guild  -8.9% -5.1% 
Notes: ENEU-ENAMIN small sample. Survivors only.   41
 
Table 7 - Income growth, OLS 
Covariates:  H H,Z  H,Z,F 
New Credit  -0.091 -0.098  -0.095 
  (0.039)** (0.041)* (0.040)*
Formal Credit  -0.081 -0.090  -0.083 
  (0.069) (0.071)  (0.069) 
Informal Credit  -0.094 -0.099  -0.098 
  (0.045)* (0.045)* (0.045)*
Training  -0.056 -0.061  -0.047 
  (0.070) (0.070)  (0.070) 
Taxes  0.004 -0.006  0.000 
  (0.032) (0.034)  (0.035) 
Guild  -0.020 -0.027  -0.021 
  (0.039) (0.039)  (0.039) 
Notes:  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 8 - Income growth, ATT propensity score matching estimates - 
different methods 
Matching on:  P(H) P(H,Z) P(H,Z,F) P(H) P(H,Z)  P(H,Z,F) 
  Nearest neighbor  Kernel 
New Credit  -0.115  -0.094  -0.105 -0.107 -0.106 -0.102 
  (0.073) (0.056) (0.061) (0.038)** (0.040)** (0.039)** 
Formal Credit  -0.105  -0.074  -0.020 -0.102 -0.104 -0.095 
  (0.114)  (0.109) (0.106) (0.078) (0.063) (0.083) 
Informal Credit  -0.152  -0.038  -0.016 -0.095 -0.095 -0.093 
  (0.059)**  (0.066) (0.066) (0.050) (0.051) (0.045)* 
Training  -0.086  -0.115  0.072 -0.054 -0.053 -0.062 
  (0.104)  (0.090) (0.096) (0.066) (0.064) (0.072) 
Taxes  -0.030  -0.031  -0.075 0.001 -0.039 -0.032 
  (0.043)  (0.058) (0.055) (0.030) (0.046) (0.052) 
Guild  0.023 0.003  -0.156 -0.025 -0.036 -0.033 
  (0.058)  (0.054) (0.052)** (0.044) (0.041) (0.038) 
Notes: Kernel based matching methods using Epanichnikov kernel and a fixed bandwidth of 0.06. 
Bootstrapping standard errors based in 50 replications with 100% sampling. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1% assuming normality. 
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Table 9 - Income growth, Treatment Effects Regression 
Covariates:  H H,Z  H,Z,F 
New Credit  -0.102 -0.064  -0.068 
  (0.114) (0.111) (0.116) 
Formal Credit  0.078 0.171  0.134 
  (0.252) (0.203) (0.216) 
Informal Credit  -0.095 -0.122  -0.125 
  (0.116) (0.110) (0.112) 
Training  0.003 -0.065  -0.080 
  (0.254) (0.191) (0.208) 
Taxes  -0.039 0.088 0.114 
  -(0.057) (0.143) (0.144) 
Guild  0.078 0.182  0.207 
  (0.132) (0.121) (0.120) 
Notes:  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.. MLE treatment 
regression. 
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Table 10 – Firm Survival likelihood 
   Survival likelihood 
Treatment Treated  Non-treated 
New Credit  80.3% 72.7% 
Formal Credit  85.7% 73.5% 
Informal Credit  78.9% 73.3% 
Taxes  82.6% 70.0% 
Training  77.6% 73.7% 
Guild  82.7% 72.2% 
Notes: ENEU-ENAMIN small sample. 
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Table 11 - Firm survival, ATT propensity score matching 
estimates - different methods 
Matching on:  P(H) P(H,Z)  P(H,Z,F) P(H) P(H,Z)  P(H,Z,F) 
Income growth  Nearest neighbor  Kernel 
New Credit  0.048 0.069 0.023 0.027 0.042 0.022 
 (0.024)* (0.022)** (0.023)  (0.015) (0.015)** (0.018) 
Formal Credit  0.009 0.075 -0.005 0.035  0.061 0.032 
  (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.026) (0.021)** (0.028) 
Informal Credit  0.022 0.040 -0.006 0.023  0.035 0.020 
  (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.020) (0.017)* (0.015) 
Training  -0.003 0.009 -0.028 0.006  0.014  0.004 
  (0.044) (0.037) (0.049) (0.024) (0.023) (0.034) 
Taxes  0.051 0.090 0.036 0.051 0.071 0.044 
 (0.022)* (0.020)** (0.017)* (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.019)* 
Guild  0.033 0.033 0.019 0.025 0.042 0.018 
  (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017)* (0.014) 
Notes: Kernel based matching methods using Epanichnikov kernel and a fixed bandwidth of 0.06. 
Bootstrapping standard errors based in 50 replications with 100% sampling. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1% assuming normality. 
 